Why the Pandemic Probably Started in a Lab, in 5 Key Points

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為什麼說新冠病毒可能是從武漢病毒研究所洩漏的
Why the Pandemic Probably Started in a Lab, in 5 Key Points
ALINA CHAN
2024年6月5日
On Monday, Dr. Anthony Fauci returned to the halls of Congress and testified before the House subcommittee investigating the Covid-19 pandemic. He was questioned about several topics related to the government’s handling of Covid-19, including how the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which he directed until retiring in 2022, supported risky virus work at a Chinese institute whose research may have caused the pandemic.
週一，安東尼·福奇回到美國國會的會議室，在眾議院調查新冠病毒大流行委員會前作證。他被問及與政府處理新冠病毒有關的幾個話題，包括他在2022年退休之前一直領導的國家過敏症與傳染病研究所如何支持了一家中國研究所從事高風險病毒研究工作，該研究所的工作可能導致了這次大流行。
For more than four years, reflexive partisan politics have derailed the search for the truth about a catastrophe that has touched us all. It has been estimated that at least 25 million people around the world have died because of Covid-19, with over a million of those deaths in the United States.
四年多來，條件反射式的黨派政治阻礙了人們探尋這場影響我們所有人的災難的真相。據估計，全球至少有2500萬人死於新冠病毒，美國的死亡人數超過了100萬。
Although how the pandemic started has been hotly debated, a growing volume of evidence — gleaned from public records released under the Freedom of Information Act, digital sleuthing through online databases, scientific papers analyzing the virus and its spread, and leaks from within the U.S. government — suggests that the pandemic most likely occurred because a virus escaped from a research lab in Wuhan, China. If so, it would be the most costly accident in the history of science.
儘管大流行的起因一直備受爭議，但越來越多的證據——從通過《信息自由法》獲取的公共記錄、用在線數據庫進行的數字調查、分析病毒及其傳播的科學論文，以及來自美國政府內部的洩密——表明，大流行發生最有可能的原因是，病毒從中國武漢的一個研究實驗室洩漏出來了。如果是這樣，那將是科學史上代價最慘重的事故。
Here’s what we now know:
以下是我們現在所知道的:
廣告
1. The SARS-like virus that caused the pandemic emerged in Wuhan, the city where the world’s foremost research lab for SARS-like viruses is located.
1. 導致大流行的SARS類病毒出現在武漢，世界上最重要的SARS類病毒研究實驗室就設在這座城市。
• At the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a team of scientists had been hunting for SARS-like viruses for over a decade, led by Shi Zhengli.
· 在武漢病毒研究所，石正麗領導一個科學家團隊十多年來一直在尋找SARS類病毒。
• Their research showed that the viruses most similar to SARS‑CoV‑2, the virus that caused the pandemic, circulate in bats that live roughly 1,000 miles away from Wuhan. Scientists from Dr. Shi’s team traveled repeatedly to Yunnan province to collect these viruses and had expanded their search to Southeast Asia. Bats in other parts of China have not been found to carry viruses that are as closely related to SARS-CoV-2.
· 他們的研究表明，與導致此次大流行的SARS-CoV-2病毒最相似的病毒在距離武漢約1600公里的蝙蝠中傳播。石正麗團隊的科學家多次前往雲南省收集這些蝙蝠病毒，並將搜索範圍擴大到了東南亞。中國其他地區的蝙蝠未被發現攜帶與SARS-CoV-2密切相關的病毒。
• Even at hot spots where these viruses exist naturally near the cave bats of southwestern China and Southeast Asia, the scientists argued, as recently as 2019, that bat coronavirus spillover into humans is rare.
· 這些科學家們直到2019年都在提出，即使在離這些病毒自然存在的熱點地區（如中國西南部和東南亞的蝙蝠洞穴）附近，蝙蝠冠狀病毒向人類溢出的情況也很罕見。
• When the Covid-19 outbreak was detected, Dr. Shi initially wondered if the novel coronavirus had come from her laboratory, saying she had never expected such an outbreak to occur in Wuhan.
· 當新冠病毒的暴發被發現時，石正麗最初曾琢磨過這種新型冠狀病毒是否來自她的實驗室的問題，她說，她從未預料到這種暴發會發生在武漢。
• The SARS‑CoV‑2 virus is exceptionally contagious and can jump from species to species like wildfire. Yet it left no known trace of infection at its source or anywhere along what would have been a thousand-mile journey before emerging in Wuhan.
· SARS-CoV-2病毒具有極強的傳染性，能像野火一樣從一個物種跨越到另一個物種。然而，這個病毒沒有在它的源頭留下任何已知的感染蹤跡，也沒有在它出現在武漢之前的1600公里沿途留下任何已知的感染蹤跡。
廣告
2. The year before the outbreak, the Wuhan institute, working with U.S. partners, had proposed creating viruses with SARS‑CoV‑2’s defining feature.
2. 在疫情暴發的前一年，武漢病毒研究所曾與美國的合作夥伴一起提出了製造具有SARS-CoV-2特徵的病毒的建議。
• Dr. Shi’s group was fascinated by how coronaviruses jump from species to species. To find viruses, they took samples from bats and other animals, as well as from sick people living near animals carrying these viruses or associated with the wildlife trade. Much of this work was conducted in partnership with the EcoHealth Alliance, a U.S.-based scientific organization that, since 2002, has been awarded over $80 million in federal funding to research the risks of emerging infectious diseases.
· 石正麗的團隊對冠狀病毒如何從一個物種跳躍到另一個物種極感興趣。為了尋找病毒，他們從蝙蝠和其他動物身上採集了樣本，也從居住在攜帶這些病毒的動物附近，或與野生動物貿易有關的病人身上採集了樣本。這項工作的大部分是與生態健康聯盟合作進行的。生態健康聯盟是一家總部設在美國的科學組織，自2002年以來，該組織獲得了8000多萬美元的聯邦資金，用於研究新發傳染病的風險。
• The laboratory pursued risky research that resulted in viruses becoming more infectious: Coronaviruses were grown from samples from infected animals and genetically reconstructed and recombined to create new viruses unknown in nature. These new viruses were passed through cells from bats, pigs, primates and humans and were used to infect civets and humanized mice (mice modified with human genes). In essence, this process forced these viruses to adapt to new host species, and the viruses with mutations that allowed them to thrive emerged as victors.
· 該實驗室進行了讓病毒變得更具傳染性的高風險研究：從受感染的動物樣本中培養出冠狀病毒，經過基因重建和重組，創造出自然界中未知的新病毒。然後用這些新病毒來感染實驗用的蝙蝠、豬、靈長類動物和人類的細胞，並用其來感染果子狸和人源化小鼠（用人類基因改造過的小鼠）。從本質上說，這一過程迫使這些病毒適應新的宿主物種，發生了有利於生存的突變的病毒，最終脫穎而出。
• By 2019, Dr. Shi’s group had published a database describing more than 22,000 collected wildlife samples. But external access was shut off in the fall of 2019, and the database was not shared with American collaborators even after the pandemic started, when such a rich virus collection would have been most useful in tracking the origin of SARS‑CoV‑2. It remains unclear whether the Wuhan institute possessed a precursor of the pandemic virus.
· 石正麗團隊曾在2019年公開過一個數據庫，裡面有對超過2.2萬個採集來的野生動物樣本的描述。但到2019年秋季時，該數據庫不再對外開放，即使在大流行開始後，也沒有與與美國合作者共享過該數據庫，而採集來的如此豐富的病毒資源本該對追蹤SARS-CoV-2的起源最為有用。目前尚不清楚武漢病毒所是否擁有引發大流行的新冠病毒的前體。
• In 2021, The Intercept published a leaked 2018 grant proposal for a research project named Defuse, which had been written as a collaboration between EcoHealth, the Wuhan institute and Ralph Baric at the University of North Carolina, who had been on the cutting edge of coronavirus research for years. The proposal described plans to create viruses strikingly similar to SARS‑CoV‑2.
· 2021年，「截擊」網站公布了一份洩漏出來的2018年為一個名叫「化解」(Defuse)的項目提交的資金申請，申請書將研究描述為生態健康聯盟、武漢病毒所和北卡羅萊納大學的拉爾夫·巴里克的合作項目，後者多年來一直處於冠狀病毒研究的前沿。這份申請書描述了製造與SARS-CoV-2驚人地相似的病毒的方案。
• Coronaviruses bear their name because their surface is studded with protein spikes, like a spiky crown, which they use to enter animal cells. The Defuse project proposed to search for and create SARS-like viruses carrying spikes with a unique feature: a furin cleavage site — the same feature that enhances SARS‑CoV‑2’s infectiousness in humans, making it capable of causing a pandemic. Defuse was never funded by the United States. However, in his testimony on Monday, Dr. Fauci explained that the Wuhan institute would not need to rely on U.S. funding to pursue research independently.
· 冠狀病毒之所以得其名，是因為它們的表面布滿了刺突蛋白，看上去像是帶刺的花冠，冠狀病毒用這些刺突侵入動物細胞。「化解」項目提出尋找並製造帶有一個獨特性質的刺突蛋白——弗林蛋白酶切割位點的SARS相關冠狀病毒。該特徵增強了SARS‑CoV‑2在人類中的傳染性，使其能夠引發大流行。「化解」項目從未得到美國的資助。不過，福奇在週一的聽證會上解釋說，武漢病毒所開展自己獨立的研究不需要依靠美國的資助。
廣告
• While it’s possible that the furin cleavage site could have evolved naturally (as seen in some distantly related coronaviruses), out of the hundreds of SARS-like viruses cataloged by scientists, SARS‑CoV‑2 is the only one known to possess a furin cleavage site in its spike. And the genetic data suggest that the virus had only recently gained the furin cleavage site before it started the pandemic.
· 雖然弗林蛋白酶切割位點可能是自然演化的結果（正如在一些遠緣冠狀病毒中看到的那樣），但在科學家已登記在案的數百種SARS類冠狀病毒中，SARS‑CoV‑2是唯一已知的在刺突中具有弗林蛋白酶切割位點的病毒。其基因數據表明，該病毒在引發大流行前不久才獲得了弗林蛋白酶切割位點。
• Ultimately, a never-before-seen SARS-like virus with a newly introduced furin cleavage site, matching the description in the Wuhan institute’s Defuse proposal, caused an outbreak in Wuhan less than two years after the proposal was drafted.
· 從根本上說，一種前所未見的、具有新引進的弗林蛋白酶切割位點的SARS類冠狀病毒，也就是與武漢研究所「化解」項目描述的病毒相吻合的病毒，在申請書起草後不到兩年的時間裡在武漢引發了疫情。
• When the Wuhan scientists published their seminal paper about Covid-19 as the pandemic roared to life in 2020, they did not mention the virus’s furin cleavage site — a feature they should have been on the lookout for, according to their own grant proposal, and a feature quickly recognized by other scientists.
· 在大流行2020年開始肆虐之際，武漢病毒所的科學家們發表了對以後的發展有重大影響的新冠病毒疾病研究論文，但他們沒有在論文中提該病毒的弗林蛋白酶切割位點，而根據他們自己寫的資金申請，這正是他們本該注意到的一個特徵，這個特徵很快就被其他科學家認識到了。
• Worse still, as the pandemic raged, their American collaborators failed to publicly reveal the existence of the Defuse proposal. The president of EcoHealth, Peter Daszak, recently admitted to Congress that he doesn’t know about virus samples collected by the Wuhan institute after 2015 and never asked the lab’s scientists if they had started the work described in Defuse. In May, citing failures in EcoHealth’s monitoring of risky experiments conducted at the Wuhan lab, the Biden administration suspended all federal funding for the organization and Dr. Daszak, and initiated proceedings to bar them from receiving future grants. In his testimony on Monday, Dr. Fauci said that he supported the decision to suspend and bar EcoHealth.
· 更糟糕的是，隨著大流行的進一步蔓延，武漢科學家的美國合作者們並沒有將「化解」計劃的存在公開出來。生態健康聯盟總裁彼得·達扎克最近向國會承認，他不了解武漢病毒所2015年後採集到的病毒樣本，也從未問過該實驗室的科學家，他們是否已經開始了「化解」項目中所描述的工作。今年5月，拜登政府以生態健康聯盟沒有對武漢病毒所進行的高風險實驗進行監管為由，暫停了聯邦政府向該組織和達扎克提供的所有資金，並啟動了禁止他們今後獲得聯邦資金的程序。福奇在週一的聽證會上說，他支持暫停和禁止生態健康聯盟獲得聯邦資金的決定。
• Separately, Dr. Baric described the competitive dynamic between his research group and the institute when he told Congress that the Wuhan scientists would probably not have shared their most interesting newly discovered viruses with him. Documents and email correspondence between the institute and Dr. Baric are still being withheld from the public while their release is fiercely contested in litigation.
· 另外，巴里克在國會作證時描述了他的研究小組與武漢病毒所之間的競爭性互動，他告訴國會，該所的科學家們可能不會與他分享他們最有意思的、新發現的病毒。該研究所與巴里克之間的往來文件和電子郵件仍未向公眾公開，而公開這些文件和電子郵件往來的訴訟也在激烈進行中。
• In the end, American partners very likely knew of only a fraction of the research done in Wuhan. According to U.S. intelligence sources, some of the institute’s virus research was classified or conducted with or on behalf of the Chinese military. In the congressional hearing on Monday, Dr. Fauci repeatedly acknowledged the lack of visibility into experiments conducted at the Wuhan institute, saying, “None of us can know everything that’s going on in China, or in Wuhan, or what have you. And that’s the reason why — I say today, and I’ve said at the T.I.,” referring to his transcribed interview with the subcommittee, “I keep an open mind as to what the origin is.”
· 到頭來，美國的合作夥伴們很可能只了解武漢病毒所的研究的一小部分。據美國情報來源稱，該研究所的一些病毒研究是保密的，保密研究或是與中國軍方合作、或是受雇于軍方進行的。福奇在週一的國會聽證會上多次承認，對武漢病毒所的實驗缺乏了解，他說：「我們不可能知道在中國、在武漢，或者在其他地方發生的所有事情。這就是為什麼——我今天說的，我在TI裡也說過，」TI指的是該委員會對他進行的有筆錄的問詢，「我對病毒起源持開放態度。」
廣告
3. The Wuhan lab pursued this type of work under low biosafety conditions that could not have contained an airborne virus as infectious as SARS‑CoV‑2.
3. 武漢病毒所在生物安全等級低的實驗室進行了這類工作，不可能控制住由空氣傳播的、具有像SARS-CoV-2這樣的傳染性的病毒。
• Labs working with live viruses generally operate at one of four biosafety levels (known in ascending order of stringency as BSL-1, 2, 3 and 4) that describe the work practices that are considered sufficiently safe depending on the characteristics of each pathogen. The Wuhan institute’s scientists worked with SARS-like viruses under inappropriately low biosafety conditions.
· 跟活病毒打交道的實驗室通常分為四個生物安全等級（安全性從低到高分為生物安全1級、2級、3級和4級），這些安全等級根據每種病原體的特性，描述了被認為是足夠安全的實驗操作。武漢病毒所的科學家們在不合適的低生物安全等級下進行了SARS類病毒研究。
• In one experiment, Dr. Shi’s group genetically engineered an unexpectedly deadly SARS-like virus (not closely related to SARS‑CoV‑2) that exhibited a 10,000-fold increase in the quantity of virus in the lungs and brains of humanized mice. Wuhan institute scientists handled these live viruses at low biosafety levels, including BSL-2.
· 石正麗團隊在一項實驗中，用基因工程技術改造出一種出人意料的致命SARS類病毒（該病毒與SARS-CoV-2沒有密切關係），這種病毒在人源化小鼠的肺和大腦中展現出的數量是改造前的1萬倍。武漢病毒所的科學家在生物安全等級低、包括生物安全2級的實驗室裡用這些活病毒做實驗。
• Even the much more stringent containment at BSL-3 cannot fully prevent SARS‑CoV‑2 from escaping. Two years into the pandemic, the virus infected a scientist in a BSL-3 laboratory in Taiwan, which was, at the time, a zero-Covid country. The scientist had been vaccinated and was tested only after losing the sense of smell. By then, more than 100 close contacts had been exposed. Human error is a source of exposure even at the highest biosafety levels, and the risks are much greater for scientists working with infectious pathogens at low biosafety.
· 即使在生物安全3級的更嚴格條件下，也無法完全阻止SARS-CoV-2病毒的逃逸。大流行進入第二年時，該病毒感染了一名在台灣一個生物安全3級的實驗室工作的研究助理，那之前，台灣還沒有出現過一例新冠病毒感染病例。該研究助理已經完成了當時所有的疫苗接種，她在失去嗅覺後才做了病毒檢測，做檢測之前已與100多人有過密切接觸。即使在生物安全等級最高的實驗室，也有人為錯誤導致接觸病源體的可能性，對在生物安全等級低的實驗室進行傳染性病原體研究的科學家來說，風險要大得多。
• An early draft of the Defuse proposal stated that the Wuhan lab would do their virus work at BSL-2 to make it “highly cost-effective.” Dr. Baric added a note to the draft highlighting the importance of using BSL-3 to contain SARS-like viruses that could infect human cells, writing that “U.S. researchers will likely freak out.” Years later, after SARS‑CoV‑2 had killed millions, Dr. Baric wrote to Dr. Daszak: “I have no doubt that they followed state determined rules and did the work under BSL-2. Yes China has the right to set their own policy. You believe this was appropriate containment if you want but don’t expect me to believe it. Moreover, don’t insult my intelligence by trying to feed me this load of BS.”
• 「化解」項目資金申請的一份早期草稿中寫道，武漢病毒所將在生物安全2級實驗室開展病毒工作，這使其「極具成本效益」。巴里克在草稿中加了一條批註，強調了對防止可能感染人類細胞的SARS類病毒來說使用生物安全3級實驗室的重要性，他寫道「美國研究人員可能會很害怕」。幾年後，在SARS-CoV-2導致了數百萬人死亡後，巴里克在寫給達扎克的信中說：「我毫不懷疑他們遵循了國家制定的規則，在生物安全2級實驗室裡開展了工作。是，中國有權制定自己的政策。如果你願意，你可以相信這是適當的防範措施，但不要指望我也相信。此外，不要試圖用這些廢話來侮辱我的智商。」
• SARS‑CoV‑2 is a stealthy virus that transmits effectively through the air, causes a range of symptoms similar to those of other common respiratory diseases and can be spread by infected people before symptoms even appear. If the virus had escaped from a BSL-2 laboratory in 2019, the leak most likely would have gone undetected until too late.
• SARS-CoV-2是一種詭秘的病毒，能通過空氣高效傳播，引發一系列與其他常見呼吸道疾病相似的癥狀，並讓感染者在癥狀出現之前感染別人。如果該病毒是2019年從一個生物安全2級實驗室洩漏出來的話，這次洩漏很有可能不會被發現，直到為時已晚。
廣告
• One alarming detail — leaked to The Wall Street Journal and confirmed by current and former U.S. government officials — is that scientists on Dr. Shi’s team fell ill with Covid-like symptoms in the fall of 2019. One of the scientists had been named in the Defuse proposal as the person in charge of virus discovery work. The scientists denied having been sick.
• 一個駭人的細節是，石正麗團隊的科學家在2019年秋季就出現了類似新冠病毒疾病的癥狀，這個洩漏給《華爾街日報》的細節已得到現任和前任美國政府官員的證實。其中一名科學家的名字在「化解」項目資金申請中是作為病毒工作負責人出現的。該細節中的科學家否認他們曾患病。
4. The hypothesis that Covid-19 came from an animal at the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan is not supported by strong evidence.
4. 新冠病毒來自武漢華南海鮮市場某個動物的假說沒有強有力的證據支持。
• In December 2019, Chinese investigators assumed the outbreak had started at a centrally located market frequented by thousands of visitors daily. This bias in their search for early cases meant that cases unlinked to or located far away from the market would very likely have been missed. To make things worse, the Chinese authorities blocked the reporting of early cases not linked to the market and, claiming biosafety precautions, ordered the destruction of patient samples on January 3, 2020, making it nearly impossible to see the complete picture of the earliest Covid-19 cases. Information about dozens of early cases from November and December 2019 remains inaccessible.
• 中國調查人員2019年12月作出的假設是，新冠病毒暴發在一個位於鬧市區的市場，每天有成千上萬的人到那裡買東西。他們尋找早期病例時帶有這種認識上的偏見，這意味著與市場無關或遠離市場的病例很可能被遺漏了。讓事情變得更糟的是，中國當局封鎖了與該市場無關的早期病例的報導，並以生物安全預防措施為由，在2020年1月3日下令銷毀了來自早期患者的樣本，這讓了解新冠病毒疾病最早期病例的完整情況變得幾乎不可能。外界仍無法獲得有關2019年11月和12月的幾十例早期病例的信息。
• A pair of papers published in Science in 2022 made the best case for SARS‑CoV‑2 having emerged naturally from human-animal contact at the Wuhan market by focusing on a map of the early cases and asserting that the virus had jumped from animals into humans twice at the market in 2019. More recently, the two papers have been countered by other virologists and scientists who convincingly demonstrate that the available market evidence does not distinguish between a human superspreader event and a natural spillover at the market.
• 兩篇2022年發表在《科學》雜誌上的論文為SARS-CoV-2是從武漢海鮮市場裡人與動物的接觸中自然出現的提供了最有力的論據支持，這兩篇論文的重點是早期病例分布圖，並斷言新冠病毒在2019年兩次在海鮮市場從動物跳躍到人類身上。最近，這兩篇論文已遭到了其他病毒學家和科學家的反駁，反駁者令人信服地證明，現有的市場證據不能區分市場發生的人類超級傳播者事件與自然溢出事件。
• Furthermore, the existing genetic and early case data show that all known Covid-19 cases probably stem from a single introduction of SARS‑CoV‑2 into people, and the outbreak at the Wuhan market probably happened after the virus had already been circulating in humans.
• 此外，現有的基因和早期病例數據顯示，所有已知的新冠病毒感染病例都可能源於一次SARS-CoV-2向人類的跳躍，武漢那家市場的疫情可能是在病毒已在人類當中傳播之後發生的。
• Not a single infected animal has ever been confirmed at the market or in its supply chain. Without good evidence that the pandemic started at the Huanan Seafood Market, the fact that the virus emerged in Wuhan points squarely at its unique SARS-like virus laboratory.
• 沒有一隻得到過證實的在市場或其供應鏈中被感染的動物。沒有確鑿的證據表明大流行始於華南海鮮市場，這個事實將病毒在武漢出現的矛頭徑直指向其獨有的研究SARS類病毒的實驗室。
5. Key evidence that would be expected if the virus had emerged from the wildlife trade is still missing.
5. 如果說病毒來自野生動物貿易的話，關鍵的證據仍然缺失。
• Despite the intense search trained on the animal trade and people linked to the market, investigators have not reported finding any animals infected with SARS‑CoV‑2 that had not been infected by humans. Yet, infected animal sources and other connective pieces of evidence were found for the earlier SARS and MERS outbreaks as quickly as within a few days, despite the less advanced viral forensic technologies of two decades ago.
• 儘管對從事動物貿易和與市場有關的人員進行了深入調查，但調查人員並未報告發現有動物被人類之外的途徑傳染了SARS-CoV-2病毒。然而，儘管20年前的病毒鑒定技術不如現在的先進，但在以前SARS和MERS疫情暴發的幾天內，調查人員就找到了受感染動物源以及與其相關的證據。
• Even though Wuhan is the home base of virus hunters with world-leading expertise in tracking novel SARS-like viruses, investigators have either failed to collect or report key evidence that would be expected if Covid-19 emerged from the wildlife trade. For example, investigators have not determined that the earliest known cases had exposure to intermediate host animals before falling ill. No antibody evidence shows that animal traders in Wuhan are regularly exposed to SARS-like viruses, as would be expected in such situations.
• 儘管武漢是擁有追蹤新型SARS類病毒方面世界領先專業知識的病毒獵尋者的基地，但調查人員一直沒有收集到或沒有報告過預計存在的關鍵證據——如果新冠病毒源自野生動物貿易的話。例如，調查人員一直沒有確定最早的已知患者是否在患病前接觸過中間宿主動物。沒有抗體證據表明，武漢從事動物販賣的人與SARS類病毒有經常性的接觸，如果病毒源於動物的話，這會是預料之中的情況。
• With today’s technology, scientists can detect how respiratory viruses — including SARS, MERS and the flu — circulate in animals while making repeated attempts to jump across species. Thankfully, these variants usually fail to transmit well after crossing over to a new species and tend to die off after a small number of infections. In contrast, virologists and other scientists agree that SARS‑CoV‑2 required little to no adaptation to spread rapidly in humans and other animals. The virus appears to have succeeded in causing a pandemic upon its only detected jump into humans.
• 科學家們能用當今的技術檢測到呼吸道病毒（包括 SARS、MERS，以及流感）在動物中的傳播，以及在傳播過程中不斷進行的跨越物種嘗試。值得慶幸的是，這些病毒變異體在跨越到一個新物種之後通常傳播效果不佳，往往會在感染了少數宿主之後逐漸消失。相比之下，病毒學家和其他科學家一致認為，SARS-CoV-2幾乎不需要任何適應就能在人類和其他動物中迅速傳播。這個病毒似乎在其唯一一次被檢測出跳躍到人類傳播後，就成功地引發了大流行。
The pandemic could have been caused by any of hundreds of virus species, at any of tens of thousands of wildlife markets, in any of thousands of cities, and in any year. But it was a SARS-like coronavirus with a unique furin cleavage site that emerged in Wuhan, less than two years after scientists, sometimes working under inadequate biosafety conditions, proposed collecting and creating viruses of that same design.
大流行可能會由數百種病毒中的任何一種引發，可能會在以萬為計的野生動物市場中的任何一個、在以千為計的城市中的任何一個發生，也可能在任何一年發生。但引發這次大流行的是一種在武漢出現的具有獨特弗林蛋白酶切割位點的SARS類冠狀病毒，而且是在科學家們提出收集和製造有相同設計的病毒，有時是在生物安全條件不充分的情況下工作，不到兩年後出現的。
While several natural spillover scenarios remain plausible, and we still don’t know enough about the full extent of virus research conducted at the Wuhan institute by Dr. Shi’s team and other researchers, a laboratory accident is the most parsimonious explanation of how the pandemic began.
雖然幾種自然溢出的可能性仍然存在，而且我們仍對石正麗團隊和其他研究人員在武漢病毒所進行的病毒研究缺乏足夠的了解，但實驗室事故是這場大流行如何開始的最容易得出的解釋。
Given what we now know, investigators should follow their strongest leads and subpoena all exchanges between the Wuhan scientists and their international partners, including unpublished research proposals, manuscripts, data and commercial orders. In particular, exchanges from 2018 and 2019 — the critical two years before the emergence of Covid-19 — are very likely to be illuminating (and require no cooperation from the Chinese government to acquire), yet they remain beyond the public’s view more than four years after the pandemic began.
據我們現在所知道的情況，調查人員應該順著最有力的線索，用法庭傳喚來獲得所有武漢病毒所的科學家與國際合作夥伴之間的交流，包括未發表的研究提案、手稿、數據和商業訂單。特別是2018年和2019年（即新冠病毒疾病出現前的關鍵兩年）的交流，很可能具有啟發性（而且不需要得到中國政府的配合就能獲得），但在大流行開始已經四年多後，公眾仍沒有看到這些交流。
Whether the pandemic started on a lab bench or in a market stall, it is undeniable that U.S. federal funding helped to build an unprecedented collection of SARS-like viruses at the Wuhan institute, as well as contributing to research that enhanced them. Advocates and funders of the institute’s research, including Dr. Fauci, should cooperate with the investigation to help identify and close the loopholes that allowed such dangerous work to occur. The world must not continue to bear the intolerable risks of research with the potential to cause pandemics.
無論大流行始於實驗室工作台還是市場攤位，不可否認的是，美國聯邦資金幫助武漢病毒所建立了前所未有的SARS類病毒收藏，並支持了增強這些病毒性能的研究工作。倡導和為武漢病毒所提供過資金的人，包括福奇在內，應該配合調查，幫助找到並彌補讓這類危險工作成為可能的漏洞。世界絕不能繼續承擔可能引發大流行的研究工作所帶來的無法容忍的風險。
A successful investigation of the pandemic’s root cause would have the power to break a decades-long scientific impasse on pathogen research safety, determining how governments will spend billions of dollars to prevent future pandemics. A credible investigation would also deter future acts of negligence and deceit by demonstrating that it is indeed possible to be held accountable for causing a viral pandemic. Last but not least, people of all nations need to see their leaders — and especially, their scientists — heading the charge to find out what caused this world-shaking event. Restoring public trust in science and government leadership requires it.
對大流行根源的成功調查將有能力打破數十年來科學界在病原體研究安全方面的僵局，讓各國政府能確定如何花數十億美元來預防未來的大流行。可信的調查還將通過證明確實有可能追究造成病毒大流行者的責任，來阻止未來的疏忽和欺騙行為。最後但同樣最重要的是，各國人民都需要看到他們的領導人——尤其是他們的科學家——帶頭找出引發這場震驚世界事件的原因。這樣做才能恢復公眾對科學和政府領導力的信任。
A thorough investigation by the U.S. government could unearth more evidence while spurring whistleblowers to find their courage and seek their moment of opportunity. It would also show the world that U.S. leaders and scientists are not afraid of what the truth behind the pandemic may be.
美國政府進行的徹底調查可能會發現更多的證據，同時激勵舉報人鼓起勇氣，尋找機會。這也會向世界表明，美國領導人和科學家們並不懼怕大流行背後的真相。
Alina Chan(@ayjchan)是麻省理工學院和哈佛大學布羅德研究所的分子生物學家，也是《病毒：尋找新冠病毒的起源》(Viral:The Search For the Origin of Covid-19)一書的合著者。她是病原體項目(Pathogens Project)的成員，該項目由《原子科學家公報》(Atomic Scientists)組織，旨在為責任重大的高風險病原體研究提供新思路。